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Abstract: 
 
 
The current research analyzes the trend of the NEETs, or young individuals 
that are not in education, employment, or training, in the Arab economies, based on 
the estimated NEET data in the contribution of Driouchi and Harkat (2017). Evidence 
shows that the trends of the NEETs are increasing in 9 Arab economies, decreasing in 
Algeria and statistically not significant for the remaining countries. This is assumed 
to be related to the absence of policies, programs, and strategies that directly target 
this category of youth. The present contribution assesses also, the determinants of the 
NEETs using Granger Causality test. The link between this category of youth and 
variables such as education, macroeconomic, and governance is assessed. The 
empirical findings indicate that each of the Arab economies exhibits a unique model 
with specific factors leading to the changes of this segment of population. This 
provides supporting evidence of the surrounding environment of the NEETs, and gives 
incentives to policy makers for monitoring through targeted policies, the significant 
factors that enable this category of youth. 
 
JEL: I25; I32; J62; J68. 
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Introduction: 
The higher the unemployment rate, the more countries, mostly developing 
ones, are likely to have economic and political instability, (Harkat, Driouchi, 
Achehboune, 2016). But, existing policies for youth inclusion in Arab economies are 
mainly targeting employment and education, separately. ETF (2015a) indicates that 
the unemployment indicator does not capture the overall situation of youth, as it does 
not apprehend the human capital that is represented by education. 
The absence of targeted policies of the NEETs in Arab countries can be 
explained by data limitation, as there are only few times series observations for some 
countries such as Algeria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. For most of the 
remaining economies, they either have single or no observations. For that, the current 
contribution uses data generated from the unemployment of the group aged 15-24 as 
in the contribution of Driouchi and Harkat (2017). 
This research describes policies related to youth inclusion or development and 
focuses on the analysis of the trends of the NEET population in Arab countries. In 
addition, the current paper provides evidence on the causalities for each specific Arab 
country to give incentive to policy makers to capture the determinants that lead to the 
creation of this category of youth, as well as to support the change of policies that 
relate to education and employability. 
The questions that could be raised at this stage of the research are: 
 What are the existing policies of youth inclusion in Arab countries? 
 At which extent the NEETs exist in these economies and what are their 
trends? 
 What are the likely determinants of the NEETs when considering 
education, employment besides health, social, macroeconomic, and 
governance variables?  
 Among these latter variables, what are the most important determinants 
of this category of young individuals? 
The current paper introduces a literature review about the NEETs followed by 
a description of the youth inclusion policies in Arab countries. The third part analyzes 
the trends of the NEET population followed by the likely determinants of this 
category. The last part focuses on providing guidance to policy makers in the 
conclusion and discussion section. 
Literature Review: 
Challenges that Arab countries are facing nowadays are exacerbated by the 
increasing rates of unemployment among the youngest segments. This is mainly due 
to the low levels of supply of job opportunities besides the growing share of the 
youngest population. The youngest population in Algeria increased from 23% in 1990 
to approximately 30% in 2011. This is also the case for Jordan, Libya, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates (Chaoul, 2013; Angel-Urdinola et al., 
2010; 2012; 2014). 
Youth of the group age between 15 and 24 in Arab countries are subject to 
higher rates of unemployment compared to other age groups. Graph 1 indicates a 
cross comparison between unemployment rate of youth and total unemployment rate 
for all the sub-regions of the Arab economies, including Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries and Euro-med countries. Findings show that unemployment among 
youth is twice the unemployment of older generations (Chaoul, 2013). This is due to 
labor importing, poor educational system and school-to-work transition (ETF, 2014a). 
Graph 1: Youth unemployment across the Arab region 
 
Even if the Arab economies invested aggressively in education in these recent 
years, the employment opportunities emerged in the form of low-level activities 
besides those from the informal sector. In Tunisia, the unemployment rate accounted 
for 14.2% in 2010, with a higher rate for young graduates that accounted for 47%. 
Other persisting issues relate to the drop out from school. This latter has noticed an 
average of 10% in Arab countries in 2014 (ETF, 2014a). Furthermore, student 
participation in vocational education and training is low in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Palestine. This accounts for 6% participation for this latter country (ETF, 2013a; 
2013b). But concerning enrolment in universities, some countries scored high rates 
such as Lebanon with 53% while other countries still have lower rates such as 
Morocco with 13% (ETF, 2014a). 
All Arab countries are putting strategies to increase employability as well as 
education reach for youth. These strategies relate to youth inclusion. In the case of 
Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, focus is on highly skilled young individuals 
that are not employed (Angel-Urdinola et al, 2012). Other focus is on urban areas, and 
young women. With regard to active labor programs, most of Arab governments 
divided these strategies to have public intermediation services to enhance job 
matching quality and efficiency (World Bank, 2013; 2012; Murata, 2014), to create 
training programs to increase skills and productivity of job seekers (Kluve, 2014; 
Angel‑Urdinola et al, 2010), to have employment incentive programs to facilitate the 
hiring process (Kluve, 2014; World Bank, 2012), to have public work programs (Del 
Ninno et al, 2009), and to support entrepreneurship (ETF, 2013c, 2014b). 
Algeria initiated many programs that are “Vocational Integration Assistance 
Mechanism for Young People” that consists of 4 programs, “Social Inclusion 
Programs to fight Youth Unemployment”, “Advice, Training, Project Funding, 
Monitoring of Microbusinesses created by Young People”, “Micro Enterprise Support 
Programs”,  where providers of funds are National Employment Agency, Ministry of 
National Solidarity, Social Development Agency, National Youth Employment 
Support Agency, National Unemployment Insurance Fund, and National Agency for 
Management of Microcredit besides many others.  
For Egypt, the programs are “Youth for Employment project – pilot youth 
units, building career counseling capacity”, “National Program for Training for 
Employment”, “Job placement training program, school‑ to‑market program, 
merchandiser training program”, “Egypt@Work program”, “The Community 
Development Program (training, microcredit activities)”, “Small Enterprise 
Development Organization”, “Shoroukh program”, “Emergency Labor Intensive 
Investment Program (ELIP), costing USD 200 million”, and “Emergency 
Employment Investment Program (EEIP), costing EUR 70 million”. Providers of 
these programs are World Bank, European Union,  SFD through the Organization for 
Reconstruction and Development of the Egyptian Village, Social Fund for 
Development (SFD), Industrial Training Council (ITC), Education for Employment 
(EFE), “Nahdel El Mahroussa”, Ministry of Manpower and Migration: 300 job 
service centers, Ministry of Manpower and Migration/ International Labor 
Organization, “Masr Works” employability portal, and Licensed recruitment agencies 
(ETF, 2015b).The following table summarizes the programs and strategies for the 
remaining Arab countries. 
Table 1: Active Labor Market Programs in Arab Mediterranean Countries: 
Country Type Programs Providers 
Jordan Intermediation - National Electronic Employment 
System online platform 
(www.nees.jo) 
- Ministry of Labor: 21 public 
employment offices 
- Licensed recruitment 
agencies 
  Training and 
employment 
incentives 
- Programs that include training and 
retraining, on-the-job training and 
dual system: internships: 
employment subsidies paid to 
employers for wages and social 
contributions  
- Satellite Units Program 
- National Campaign for 
Employment - Employment subsidy 
programs 
- National Employment and 
Training Company  
- Vocational Training 
Corporation 
- Ministry of Labor 
  Entrepreneurship - Programs to support micro-
enterprises (lending and training 
services) 
- Development and 
Employment Fund 
Lebanon Intermediation - Electronic Labor Exchange: free 
online job matching service 
- National Employment 
Office (NEO): 3 offices. By 
law, NEO is the only labor 
intermediation service 
provider. However, several 
private recruitment agencies 
are illegally working in this 
field. 
  Training - An accelerated vocational training 
program 
- Subsidized vocational training for 
people with disabilities  
- Short-term vocational training. 
- Funded by NEO, provided 
by NGOs and private 
institutions    
- Vocational Training Centre 
- Social Development Centers 
of Ministry of Social Affairs 
  Entrepreneurship - Integrated SME Support Program 
(ISSP) 
- Ministry of Economy and 
Trade 
- Kafalat (a Lebanese 
financial company) 
Libya Intermediation - Ministry of Labor and 
Rehabilitation: 72 labor 
offices 
- Small professional 
employment services have 
started to develop 
- Web-based employment 
services 
  Training - Programs for demilitarized 
fighters: “IFAD”, “KADER”  
- Warriors Affairs 
Commission (WAC) 
  Entrepreneurship - Program for demilitarized fighters 
(thuwar): “Tamouh” 
- SME program 
- Warriors Affairs 
Commission (WAC) 
- National Small and Medium 
Enterprise Program 
Morocco Intermediation - National Agency for 
Employment and Skills 
Promotion (ANAPEC): 74 
offices 
- Private recruitment agencies    
- Temporary employment 
agencies 
  Training and 
employment 
incentives 
- “Idmaj” - first-time recruitment 
contract 
- “Taehil” - training contract 
- Support for training in emerging 
sectors 
- ANAPEC 
  Entrepreneurship - “Moukawalati” - support scheme 
for small business creation 
- ANAPEC 
  Public works - Intensive public work program - “Promotion nationale” 
Palestine Intermediation - Ministry of Labor: 16 
employment offices in the 
West Bank and 5 offices in 
the Gaza Strip 
- Online portal: Jobs.ps.Ltd 
  Training - Various donor-sponsored 
professional training and career 
development programs 
- NGOs: more than 2000 
organizations active in the 
labor market, such as 
“Sharek” Youth Forum, 
Education for Employment 
Foundation, Welfare 
Association 
  Entrepreneurship - Donor-sponsored entrepreneurship 
promotion programs 
- Palestinian Fund for 
Employment and Social 
Protection  
- NGOs 
Tunisia Intermediation - National Agency for 
Employment and Independent 
Work (ANETI): 91 
employment offices. By law, 
this is the only institution 
allowed to provide labor 
intermediation services. 
  Training and 
employment 
incentives 
- Employability improvement 
“cheque” 
- Employment support “cheque” 
- Program to foster employment   
- Donor-sponsored programs 
- ANETI 
- NGOs 
  Entrepreneurship - Support for small business 
entrepreneurs 
- Donor-sponsored programs 
- ANETI  
- NGOs 
  Public works - Local community partnerships to 
foster employment 
- ANETI 
Source: ETF, 2015b 
Arab countries do not have policies directly linked to the NEET, as they lack 
organizations to support this latter category. In addition, the lack of statistical 
databases limits the understanding of the NEETs in the Arab region. Still, the most 
recent contribution of Kovacheva, Popivanov, Kabaivanov (2017) indicates that even 
the new policies in the Arab Mediterranean Countries target only general inclusion of 
youth without specifying the NEETs. 
Policies of youth inclusion in Arab countries define the age groups of the 
young population differently. For instance, it is between 15 and 29 in Morocco and 
between 18 and 35 in Egypt. For other countries, there is no clear definition of the age 
group of the youth. This is the case of Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia (Strategy 
Morocco, 2014; Rhanem, 2015; Lebanon Youth Policy, 2012; Rossis, 2014; 
Churchill, 2013; Floris, 2010; Rarrbo, 2010; Algeria, 2016). 
Youth policies in Arab economies suffer from the lack of coordination. In the 
case of Morocco, there is a gap between the skills provided in the educational system 
and those required in the job market. This is also the case of Algeria and Tunisia 
(Ministry Algeria, 2015). In addition to this, other issues that relate to the youth 
policies are the imperfections of the existing ones. The imperfections in education 
policies and programs in Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia are illustrated with higher rates 
of dropout from school at early stages, as the rate of leaving school is between 33% 
and 50% within these economies (ETF, 2015a).  
Youth policies need to include the NEETs. The contribution of the World 
Bank (2013) indicates that the exclusion of this category within economies leads to 
higher rates of poverty, more political instability, as well as higher economic losses. 
Methods and Data: 
The following contribution is the analysis of the estimated NEET data of the 
Arab countries based on the contribution of Driouchi and Harkat (2017). The results 
are divided into describing youth inclusion policies, analyzing the trends of the 
NEETs population, and defining the likely determinants of the NEETs in Arab 
economies.  
The analysis of the youngest segment of the population within each of the 
Arab countries indicates both the trends of the total young population and the NEETs 
separately. An increasing young population with a negative trend of the NEETs 
indicates that youth inclusion policies capture this category of individuals. But an 
increasing trend of the NEETs population indicates that policies related to youth 
exclude this segment. 
The empirical method used for describing the NEETs trends and population in 
Arab countries is a regression analysis given by the following model: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝑡 
Where: 
𝑌𝑡: is time period (independent variable); 
𝑌𝑃𝑡: is the youth population of the age group between 15 and 24; 
𝑁𝑃𝑡: is the NEETs population of the age group between 15 and 24; 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2: are the coefficients corresponding to the YP and NP, respectively. 
The third part of the analysis is a follow up of the contribution of Driouchi and 
Harkat (2017b) based on the Granger Causality test. This test predicts the 
unidirectional and bidirectional causalities between two time series variables in a 
sense that a variable x helps predicting the accurateness of a value y and vise versa. 
In addition to the NEETs variable, the other variables are enrolment in 
education, enrolment in vocational and general education separately, expenditure on 
education as a percentage of GNI, expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, and 
world governance variables. These variables are extracted from the World Bank for 
the time period 1992 and 2016. 
The governance indicators are divided into 6 variables that are: voice and 
accountability, political stability, rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and control of corruption. 
The political stability measures the chances of the destabilization of a 
government taking into account terrorism and violent means. Concerning the 
government effectiveness, it measures the stimulus of the relationship between the 
public and private sector while the regulatory quality measures the government 
support to the private sector. The rule of the law measures the extent the law governs 
the economy and the control of corruption measures the power exerted by the public 
sector on the private one. These variables are an index with values between -2 and 2. 
The hypotheses to be tested are those of the contribution of Driouchi and 
Harkat (2017b) and are summarized in the following tables: 
Table 2: hypotheses of the Granger Causality test between the NEETs and the 
educational variables 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Education 
HA: Education does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause General Education 
HA: General Education does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Vocational 
Education 
HA: Vocational Education does not Granger cause 
NEET 
 
Table 3: hypotheses of the Granger Causality test between the NEETs, 
macroeconomic and governance variables 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Expenditure on Education 
HA: Expenditure on Education does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Expenditure on Health 
HA: Expenditure on Health does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Labor Force 
HA: Labor Force does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Voice and Accountability 
HA: Voice and Accountability does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Political Stability 
HA: Political Stability does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Government Effectiveness 
HA: Government Effectiveness does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Regulatory Quality 
HA: Regulatory quality does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Rule of Law 
HA: Rule of Law does not Granger cause NEET 
H0: NEET does not Granger cause Control of Corruption 
HA: Control of Corruption does not Granger cause NEET 
 
Education causing the NEETs implies that the educational system cannot 
support or reach the entire young segment. This is the case for the general or 
vocational system. For the macroeconomic variable, the causal relationship captures 
the determinants that lead to the creation of the NEETs such as health issues and 
demand on the labor force. Finally, the governance indicator indicates whether if the 
NEETs affect politically the economies or vise versa. For instance and in some 
economies, the NEETs lead to the political instability. 
Results and Discussion 
Three sets of results are attained based on the empirical frameworks discussed above.  
1. Unemployment and Education Programs and Policies in Arab Countries: 
In Arab countries, policies related to the inclusion of the young segment under 
25 years old target education and employment separately, which does not capture the 
link between these two indicators. In addition to that, there are no policies targeting 
directly the NEETs in Arab economies, and this can be explained by the lack of 
understanding of this phenomenon. 
According to the ILO (2010a) report related to the labor market policies, 
Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria made many modifications in terms of 
employment and education policies. In Morocco, there are many government agencies 
that were recently implemented within the country to target youth. There is the 
“Ministry of Youth and Sports” that was restructured in 2013. In addition to that, 
there are ministries of health, employment, education that encourage youth activities. 
Within Morocco, a human development initiative was launched in 2005 targeting the 
youngest segment for employment initiatives. With regard to education, Morocco has 
adopted an emergency plan between the years of 2009 and 2019 aiming to increase 
access to education as well as education quality. The last strategy that relates to youth 
is called “National Youth Strategy 2015-2030” that was launched by the Ministry of 
Youth and Sports. This strategy envisages enhancing equality among the young 
segment within the country by focusing on 5 main core elements that are the increase 
of economic opportunities that will lead to the increase of employability, the 
enhancing of access to public services for youth, the inclusion of youth in decision 
making processes, the promotion of human rights, and the reinforcement of 
institutional arrangements. It is the responsibility of the Ministry of Youth and Sports 
to coordinate with other organization and execute the Action Plan (Euromed, 2014). 
For Algeria, the government agencies targeting youth development are the 
“Ministry of Youth and Sports” that was created in 1964. This latter organization 
attempts to create in the near future a Council for youth (Rarrbo, 2010; Ministry 
Algeria, 2015; Algeria, 2016). Algeria has adopted the Action Plan of the Algerian 
Government that targets the creation of 3 million jobs before 2014, with at least 
400 000 jobs yearly starting 2009. These policies besides policies related to the 
educational system contribute to the significant decrease of the NEETs population, as 
they target the young segment of the country. 
The population of youth in Jordan is increasing significantly. This economy 
has made reform programs including reshaping the skills of the labor force, upgrading 
the industrial base within the economy and developing value added sectors in the 
knowledge economy.  
For Syria, the increase of the NEETs and the decrease of the young population 
are mainly due to political reasons (OECD, 2010). In addition to that, the school 
dropout rates within this economy for the years 2014 and 2015 are 40% and 32% 
respectively. For this, the ministry of education in Syria implemented new techniques 
in its educational system that enabled the coordination between education authorities 
and stabilization actors to enhance the delivery of formal education. The ministry of 
education also reformed the education policies and increased both the quality and 
access to schools. This was done by the training of more than 15000 teachers and 
reaching more than 480 000 students including areas that are hard to reach (Brussels 
Conference Education Report, 2017). 
Bahrain (ILO, 2010 b) is undergoing many reforms for the liberalization of the 
economy. This latter country has made many initiative related to the increase of job 
opportunities. These reforms were initiated in 2004 and 2007 through the “Labor 
Market National Plan”. In addition, the government aims at providing technical and 
financial support to job seekers. 
In an ILO (2015) report, the NEETs are targeted in Tunisia. This contribution 
split between the males and the females, as females have marriage as an alternative 
for employment. Despites all the policies made on education and employment, the 
NEETs population is still increasing within this economy, which leads questioning the 
current strategies and the previous strategies for youth inclusion. 
Concerning the main objective of the government of Yemen is to decrease 
poverty (ILO, 2008). For this many actions were taking. These actions were 
motivated by the “Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper” for the years between 2002 and 
2005, and the government has developed the third Development Plan for Poverty 
Reduction and Reform for the years between 2006 and 2010. This program has as 
main goals the inclusion of citizens for the development progress with emphasis on 
the youngest segment.  
In the case of Egypt, the ILO (2014) indicates that despites the increasing 
educational attainment, the NEETs population is still high while the unemployment 
affects one-sixth the young segment. This is due to the lack of entrepreneurs in this 
economy besides the low-quality jobs and informal employment.  
Lebanon implemented many programs to decrease the school dropout and 
enhance the education quality and accessibility within the country. For this, the 
ministry of education and higher education implemented a “RACE plan 2017-2021” 
that improved the capacity of the ministry for better administration of public schools. 
In addition to that, there are strategies such as “Accelerated Learning Program” and 
“Early Childhood Education Programs” that reached more youth and decreased so far 
the school dropout by nearly 6% in a period of 1 year. This programs target also youth 
that are refugees (Brussels Conference Education Report, 2017). 
2. Trends of young population and NEETs population aged 15-24 in Arab 
countries: 
A regression analysis between the time as an independent variable and the 
young population and NEET of the group age between 15 and 24 is made in order to 
analyze the significance of their trend according the estimated data of the Arab 
economies. Table 4 presents the results. 
Concerning Algeria, the young population within the country has a 
corresponding coefficient of 0.008 while the NEET population has a coefficient of -
0.018, which the significant t-statistic values of 5.417 and -6.031, respectively. This 
can be seen as good indicator as the youngest segment is increasing while the NEETs 
among them are decreasing. For Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, and Palestine, the coefficient of their NEETs population is not significant as 
the p-values are greater than the significant level α = 0.05, but these countries have 
significant increasing trends with regard to the youth population with the coefficients 
0.007, 0.048, 0.061, 0.017, 0.012, 0.007, and 0.043, respectively. 
Libya and Oman are the only Arab countries that indicate significant 
decreasing trend of the youth population with a significant increase in the NEETs. 
These two latter countries have decreasing coefficient for the youth population -0.204, 
-0.047, with the corresponding t-statistic value of -7.579, and -2.465, respectively, and 
an increase of the NEETs population with the coefficients of 0.823, and 0.327, with 
the corresponding t-statistic value of 7.759 and 5.184, respectively. 
Bahrain does not indicate any significant of both the young population and the 
NEETs, and this is also the case for the Arab United Emirates. Some countries do not 
indicate a significant relationship with the young segment, but shows a relationship 
with the NEETs population. For Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, and Tunisia, 
the NEETs are increasing with significant coefficients that are: 0.009, 0.321, 0.458, 
0.773, 0.039, and 0.135, respectively. 
Table 4: Regression analysis of the youth population coefficient and NEET 
between 15 and 24 on the time variable for Arab countries 
Country 
R-
squared 
Intercept 
Youth 
population 
coefficient 
NEET 
population 
coefficient 
Algeria 0.719 
 -7.966                                          
(-0.776) 
0.008                       
(5.417) 
 -0.018          
(-6.031) 
Bahrain 0.957 
 -10.689                       
(-9.872) 
  -0.016                              
(-0.042) 
 1.301                               
(0.446) 
Egypt 0.875 
 -28.404                              
(-7.278) 
 0.001                              
(1.112) 
 0.009                                
(4.279) 
Iraq 0.987 
 -28.898                           
(-27.726) 
 0.007                      
(19.677) 
 0.001                             
(0.719) 
Jordan 0.979 
 -34.455                              
(-23.412) 
 0.048                                  
(11.310) 
-0.029                     
(-1.651) 
Kuwait 0.871 
 -6.824                       
(-1.779) 
 0.001                                
(0.027) 
 0.321                        
(2.385) 
Lebanon 0.939 
 -16.643                         
(-10.414) 
-0.052                          
(-1.393) 
0.458                              
(2.388) 
Libya 0.734 
 -24.344                             
(-2.084) 
-0.204                         
(-7.579) 
0.823                              
(7.759) 
Mauritania 0.999 
 -26.529                                     
(-61.721) 
 0.061                                
(50.533) 
0.011                               
(1.393) 
Morocco 0.618 
 -87.109                                      
(-2.628) 
 0.017                                    
(5.012) 
-0.002                           
(-0.181) 
Oman 0.981 
 -15.860                              
(-18.700) 
-0.047                      
(-2.465) 
0.327                             
(5.184) 
Qatar 0.948 
 -1.769                   
(-2.066) 
-0.013                                 
(-0.852) 
0.773                     
(5.092) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.942 
 -30.208                    
(-12.166) 
 0.012                                
(4.395) 
-0.009                               
(-0.909) 
Sudan 0.994 
 -29.279                       
(-30.022) 
 0.007                               
(5.214) 
-0.001                              
(-0.151) 
Syria 0.851 
 -24.973                                    
(-5.053) 
 0.002                                   
(1.027) 
0.039                                       
(6.674) 
Tunisia 0.264 
 -32.604                                   
(-1.499) 
-0.009               
(-0.741) 
0.135                                
(2.601) 
UAE 0.839 
 -1.428                               
(-0.675) 
 0.012                                   
(0.535) 
 0.026                                
(0.188) 
Palestine 0.992 
 -17.517                          
(-25.389) 
 0.043                                
(13.659) 
-0.008                               
(-0.803) 
Yemen 0.995 
 -12.935                                
(-27.335) 
 0.005                                     
(7.948) 
 0.005                                    
(2.457) 
 
Graph 2 shows the population of the NEET between 15 and 24 in Arab 
economies and the variations of the NEETs population are explained by the variances 
in the unemployment rate. The graph indicates that in recent years the highest amount 
of the NEETs is in Egypt, followed by Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and then Algeria. Lower 
number of NEETs is found in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Still, the NEET 
population is relative to the overall population of these countries. 
Graph 2: NEET population between 15 and 24 in Arab countries: 
 
 
3. Determinants of the NEETs in Arab countries 
The following section introduces the results of the Granger causality test. The 
used method gives the causality between economic, social, educational, and political 
reasons and the NEET category. This method gives an indication to policy makers in 
the Arab region to understand the root problem of the NEET category while 
considering a specific model for each country. Analysis is indicated in terms of a 
confidence level of 5% while also those that are significant under a 10% confidence 
interval are indicated. 
Empirical findings of Driouchi and Harkat (2017b) indicate that in the case of 
Algeria, the NEETs cause vocational education, regulatory quality, and are caused by 
expenditure on health. For Egypt, it is the general education that causes the NEETs. In 
this latter economy, the NEETs cause the expenditure on education. In Saudi Arabia, 
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the NEETs have a double causality with education and labor force while in Palestine, 
no causalities are found. 
Table 5 indicates that there are no causalities between the NEETs and 
educational variables in Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon. In the case of Bahrain, and under 
a significance level of 10%, the general education causes the NEETs.  
Table 5: Granger Causality of NEETs and educational variables (set1) 
 Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Lebanon 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not 
causes Education 
0.715 0.522 2.862 0.124 2.697 0.135 0.895 0.451 
Education does not 
causes NEET 
1.767 0.242 2.396 0.161 1.224 0.350 2.508 0.151 
NEET does not 
causes General 
Education 
2.307 0.136 N/A N/A 1.869 0.191 1.593 0.236 
General Education 
does not causes 
NEET 
2.738 0.099 N/A N/A 1.848 0.194 0.526 0.602 
NEET does not 
causes Vocational 
Education 
0.631 0.546 N/A N/A 1.204 0.324 1.184 0.333 
Vocational Education 
does not causes 
NEET 
0.931 0.417 N/A N/A 2.204 0.141 1.068 0.368 
 
Regarding the causalities between the NEETs and macroeconomic and 
governance variables, the NEET causes the labor force under a significance level of 
10%. In the case of Iraq, both political stability and the rule of law causes the NEETs 
while the NEETs causes NEETs causes the regulatory quality with a significance 
level of 5%. In Kuwait, the NEETs cause the political stability and government 
effectiveness while the rule of law causes the NEETs. For Lebanon, the NEETs cause 
the expenditure on health, the labor force with a significance level of 5%, and the 
voice and accountability with a significance level of 10%. In this latter economy, only 
the government effectiveness and the control of corruption cause the NEETs (Table 
6). 
 
Table 6: Granger Causality of NEETs, macroeconomic, and governance 
variables (set1) 
 Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Lebanon 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes 
Expenditure on Education 
0.601 0.559 N/A N/A 1.184 0.335 0.014 0.986 
Expenditure on Education 
does not causes NEET 
0.136 0.874 N/A N/A 2.354 0.131 1.633 0.230 
NEET does not causes 
Expenditure on Health 
0.555 0.587 0.951 0.447 0.758 0.488 4.199 0.039 
Expenditure on Health does 
not causes NEET 
1.642 0.231 0.570 0.598 0.163 0.851 1.671 0.226 
NEET does not causes 
Labor Force 
3.633 0.054 N/A N/A 2.672 0.113 5.595 0.015 
Labor Force does not causes 
NEET 
0.109 0.897 N/A N/A 0.857 0.451 0.189 0.830 
NEET does not causes 
Voice & Accountability 
0.899 0.431 0.935 0.452 0.691 0.519 3.508 0.061 
Voice & Accountability 
does not causes NEET 
1.839 0.198 1.429 0.323 0.241 0.789 1.648 0.230 
NEET does not causes 
Political Stability 
0.688 0.534 1.433 0.301 4.781 0.049 1.794 0.235 
Political Stability does not 
causes NEET 
0.343 0.721 13.415 0.004 1.164 0.366 1.306 0.329 
NEET does not causes 
Government Effectiveness 
0.705 0.526 1.418 0.304 8.733 0.013 0.957 0.429 
Government Effectiveness 
does not causes NEET 
0.385 0.694 0.249 0.786 1.487 0.289 4.952 0.046 
NEET does not causes 
Regulatory Quality 
0.757 0.504 5.438 0.038 2.744 0.132 0.273 0.769 
Regulatory Quality does not 
causes NEET 
1.967 0.209 1.026 0.407 0.521 0.615 0.796 0.488 
NEET does not causes Rule 
of Law 
0.357 0.712 2.002 0.205 2.318 0.169 1.325 0.325 
Rule of Law does not causes 
NEET 
2.861 0.124 11.892 0.006 6.119 0.029 0.207 0.818 
NEET does not causes 
Control of Corruption 
0.462 0.648 0.412 0.668 1.547 0.278 0.505 0.624 
Control of Corruption does 
not causes NEET 
0.408 0.679 0.437 0.662 0.027 0.974 8.780 0.012 
 
Table 7 shows that the general education causes the NEETs in Libya while in 
Qatar, the vocational education causes the NEETs. 
 
Table 7: Granger Causality of NEETs and educational variables (set2) 
 Libya Qatar Sudan Syria 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes 
Education 
1.307 0.329 0.159 0.855 2.018 0.203 0.868 0.440 
Education does not causes 
NEET 
2.918 0.119 0.904 0.428 0.226 0.803 0.971 0.401 
NEET does not causes General 
Education 
1.731 0.245 0.137 0.873 0.689 0.538 0.807 0.465 
General Education does not 
causes NEET 
5.499 0.037 0.836 0.454 2.657 0.149 0.953 0.408 
NEET does not causes 
Vocational Education 
0.010 0.989 1.209 0.328 0.799 0.492 0.882 0.434 
Vocational Education does not 
causes NEET 
1.926 0.216 5.291 0.019 2.819 0.137 0.932 0.415 
 
Table 8 summarizes the findings of the granger causality tests between the 
NEETs, macroeconomic, and governance variables. Empirical results indicate that 
expenditure on health and the rule of law causes the NEETs while there is a double 
causality between the NEETs and regulatory quality in Libya. For Qatar, the NEETs 
cause expenditure on health, regulatory quality and rule of law, while they have a 
double causality with voice and accountability. For Sudan, it is the expenditure on 
health and voice and accountability that causes the NEETs. In Syria, the NEETs cause 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality. Further details indicate that under a 
significance level of 10%, the control of corruption causes the NEETs in Libya while 
it is caused by the NEETs in Qatar; also, the political stability causes the NEETs 
while these latters cause the rule of law in Syria. 
Table 8: Granger Causality of NEETs, macroeconomic, and governance 
variables (set2) 
 
 Libya Qatar Sudan Syria 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes Expenditure on 
Education 
N/A N/A 1.232 0.316 1.225 0.319 0.998 0.389 
Expenditure on Education does not 
causes NEET 
N/A N/A 0.267 0.769 2.304 0.130 0.165 0.849 
NEET does not causes Expenditure on 
Health 
0.558 0.585 4.488 0.033 1.488 0.261 1.818 0.201 
Expenditure on Health does not causes 
NEET 
4.754 0.028 0.322 0.730 5.016 0.024 1.657 0.229 
NEET does not causes Labor Force N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.299 0.752 N/A N/A 
Labor Force does not causes NEET N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.292 0.757 N/A N/A 
NEET does not causes Voice & 
Accountability 
N/A N/A 27.304 0.001 1.513 0.257 1.088 0.388 
Voice & Accountability does not 
causes NEET 
N/A N/A 6.101 0.029 4.562 0.032 0.099 0.907 
NEET does not causes Political 
Stability 
N/A N/A 2.863 0.123 1.954 0.212 0.557 0.596 
Political Stability does not causes 
NEET 
N/A N/A 3.013 0.114 0.933 0.437 3.423 0.092 
NEET does not causes Government 
Effectiveness 
0.501 0.617 2.763 0.131 0.412 0.678 8.644 0.013 
Government Effectiveness does not 
causes NEET 
4.847 0.027 0.032 0.968 2.869 0.123 0.267 0.773 
NEET does not causes Regulatory 
Quality 
5.687 0.034 7.650 0.017 2.026 0.202 4.838 0.048 
Regulatory Quality does not causes 
NEET 
21.259 0.001 0.504 0.624 0.623 0.564 0.229 0.801 
NEET does not causes Rule of Law 2.577 0.145 12.175 0.005 3.049 0.112 3.336 0.096 
Rule of Law does not causes NEET 11.222 0.007 0.263 0.776 0.737 0.512 0.058 0.944 
NEET does not causes Control of 
Corruption 
0.092 0.913 3.574 0.085 0.246 0.779 2.159 0.186 
Control of Corruption does not causes 
NEET 
3.830 0.075 0.225 0.804 0.250 0.785 0.529 0.611 
 
Table 9 indicates that the vocational education causes the NEETs in the United 
Arab Emirates while education causes the NEETs in Yemen. No additional causalities 
are found between the NEETs and the educational variables in Tunisia United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen and Morocco. 
Table 9: Granger Causality of NEETs and educational variables (set3) 
 Tunisia UAE Yemen Morocco 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes 
Education 
0.269 0.767 0.875 0.458 1.944 0.213 0.061 0.942 
Education does not causes 
NEET 
0.872 0.439 1.142 0.372 8.171 0.015 0.107 0.899 
NEET does not causes 
General Education 
0.004 0.996 3.081 0.109 N/A N/A 0.473 0.631 
General Education does not 
causes NEET 
0.448 0.648 0.597 0.576 N/A N/A 0.442 0.649 
NEET does not causes 
Vocational Education 
0.984 0.415 0.348 0.714 N/A N/A 0.213 0.810 
Vocational Education does 
not causes NEET 
1.623 0.256 4.553 0.036 N/A N/A 0.031 0.969 
 
Results of table 10 shows that the only significant causality under a significant 
level of 5% between the NEETs, macroeconomic and governance variables in the 
third set of countries is found in Tunisia, that is the NEETs cause the rule of law. But 
for a significance level of 10%, the NEETs cause political stability in Tunisia, the 
NEETs causes expenditure on health, political stability, control of corruption in the 
United Arab Emirates while they are only caused by regulatory quality. For Yemen, 
expenditure on health, political stability, and regulatory quality cause the NEETs. In 
Morocco, the NEETs have a double causality with government effectiveness while 
they cause political stability, regulatory quality and rule of law. 
Table 10: Granger Causality of NEETs, macroeconomic, and governance 
variables (set3) 
 Tunisia UAE Yemen Morocco 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes 
Expenditure on Education 
0.311 0.739 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.954 0.172 
Expenditure on Education does 
not causes NEET 
0.702 0.517 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.043 0.958 
NEET does not causes 
Expenditure on Health 
1.064 0.373 2.867 0.093 2.287 0.141 0.987 0.399 
Expenditure on Health does not 
causes NEET 
1.192 0.335 0.351 0.711 3.019 0.084 0.237 0.792 
NEET does not causes Labor 
Force 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.208 0.840 
Labor Force does not causes 
NEET 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.557 0.287 
NEET does not causes Voice & 
Accountability 
1.460 0.295 N/A N/A 2.224 0.148 2.864 0.123 
Voice & Accountability does 
not causes NEET 
0.642 0.555 N/A N/A 1.464 0.267 2.219 0.179 
NEET does not causes Political 
Stability 
3.383 0.094 3.008 0.084 1.214 0.353 4.507 0.055 
Political Stability does not 
causes NEET 
0.542 0.604 0.393 0.683 3.346 0.096 1.273 0.338 
NEET does not causes 
Government Effectiveness 
0.379 0.698 1.153 0.369 3.129 0.106 3.824 0.075 
Government Effectiveness does 
not causes NEET 
2.229 0.178 0.824 0.477 1.023 0.408 3.669 0.081 
NEET does not causes 
Regulatory Quality 
2.358 0.165 0.284 0.761 0.462 0.648 3.396 0.093 
Regulatory Quality does not 
causes NEET 
0.043 0.958 3.994 0.069 4.274 0.061 0.706 0.526 
NEET does not causes Rule of 
Law 
7.771 0.017 0.087 0.917 0.158 0.857 3.631 0.083 
Rule of Law does not causes 
NEET 
1.608 0.266 1.232 0.348 0.443 0.659 0.007 0.993 
NEET does not causes Control 
of Corruption 
0.521 0.615 3.454 0.091 0.505 0.624 0.366 0.706 
Control of Corruption does not 
causes NEET 
0.702 0.527 0.206 0.819 1.051 0.399 0.058 0.944 
 
Table 11 shows that there are no significant causalities between the NEETs 
and educational variables in Oman, Mauritania and Jordan. 
Table 11: Granger Causality of NEETs and educational variables (set4) 
 Oman Mauritania Jordan 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes Education 2.510 0.136 0.482 0.627 0.706 0.531 
Education does not causes NEET 1.500 0.274 1.473 0.261 0.198 0.825 
NEET does not causes General 
Education 
1.462 0.282 2.039 0.814 2.803 0.206 
General Education does not causes 
NEET 
1.906 0.204 2.039 0.159 0.139 0.876 
NEET does not causes Vocational 
Education 
N/A N/A 2.650 0.131 0.698 0.534 
Vocational Education does not causes 
NEET 
N/A N/A 0.492 0.629 2.500 0.162 
 
But table 12 indicates that the NEETs cause expenditure on education, 
expenditure on health while they are caused by political stability. In Jordan, the 
NEETs cause the expenditure on education and voice and accountability while they 
are caused by government effectiveness. The following results are those of a 
significance level of 10%. The NEETs have a double causality with the government 
effectiveness, cause the rule of law, and are caused by regulatory quality in Oman. In 
Mauritania, the NEETs cause the control of corruption and are caused by political 
stability. For Jordan, the NEETs cause political stability and are caused by both 
regulatory quality and control of corruption. 
Table 12: Granger Causality of NEETs, macroeconomic, and governance 
variables (set4) 
 Oman Mauritania Jordan 
 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
F-
statistic 
P-
value 
NEET does not causes Expenditure 
on Education 
46.321 
8.E-
08 
1.058 0.368 5.268 0.017 
Expenditure on Education does not 
causes NEET 
0.647 0.536 0.387 0.684 0.918 0.418 
NEET does not causes Expenditure 
on Health 
4.404 0.031 0.899 0.428 1.035 0.381 
Expenditure on Health does not 
causes NEET 
1.066 0.369 0.239 0.789 0.037 0.964 
NEET does not causes Labor Force N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Labor Force does not causes NEET N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NEET does not causes Voice & 
Accountability 
0.036 0.965 3.152 0.106 5.038 0.044 
Voice & Accountability does not 
causes NEET 
2.358 0.165 0.572 0.589 1.038 0.403 
NEET does not causes Political 
Stability 
3.213 0.102 1.984 0.208 3.404 0.093 
Political Stability does not causes 
NEET 
5.704 0.034 3.293 0.098 0.402 0.683 
NEET does not causes Government 
Effectiveness 
4.423 0.057 1.937 0.214 0.285 0.761 
Government Effectiveness does not 
causes NEET 
3.930 0.072 0.895 0.451 6.783 0.023 
NEET does not causes Regulatory 
Quality 
0.260 0.778 0.034 0.967 1.252 0.343 
Regulatory Quality does not causes 
NEET 
4.251 0.062 0.625 0.563 4.131 0.065 
NEET does not causes Rule of Law 4.131 0.065 0.280 0.764 0.632 0.559 
Rule of Law does not causes NEET 3.199 0.103 1.396 0.309 0.029 0.972 
NEET does not causes Control of 
Corruption 
0.223 0.806 3.822 0.076 1.469 0.293 
Control of Corruption does not 
causes NEET 
0.629 0.561 0.094 0.911 4.511 0.055 
 
Conclusion and Discussion: 
The current research describes the NEETs policies, trends, and determinants in 
Arab economies. Empirical results indicate that the trend of the young population in 
the group aged 15-24 in Arab countries is increasing in most of countries except for 
Libya and Oman. With regard to the NEET population, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen have increasing 
trends. Only Algeria has a significant decreasing trend of the NEETs while the 
remaining countries have non-statistically significant trends. 
This is explained by the lack of targeted policies, programs, and strategies that 
relate directly to the NEETs category. 
With regard to the determinants of the NEETs, the empirical results suggest 
that there is a specific model, in which different factors cause the NEETs in each of 
the Arab economies. For Iraq, the NEETs cause the regulatory quality while they are 
caused by political stability and rule of law. For Kuwait, the NEETs cause both the 
political stability and the government effectiveness, and are caused by the rule of law. 
For Lebanon, the NEETs cause the expenditure on health and the labor force and are 
caused by the government effectiveness and the control of corruption. For Libya, the 
NEETs are caused by the general education, expenditure on health, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, and have a double causality with the regulatory quality. In 
Qatar, the NEETs are caused by the vocational education and have a double causality 
with the voice and accountability. In this latter country, the NEETs cause the 
expenditure on health, the regulatory quality, and the rule of law. For Sudan, the 
expenditure on health and the voice and accountability cause the NEETs. In Syria, the 
NEETs cause the government effectiveness and regulatory quality. For Tunisia, the 
rule of law causes the NEETs while in the United Arab Emirates the vocational 
education causes the NEETs. Education causes the NEETs in Yemen. In Oman, the 
NEETs cause expenditure on education and expenditure on health and are caused by 
political stability. In Jordan, the NEETs cause the expenditure on education and the 
voice and accountability while they are caused by the government effectiveness. 
The above causalities are significant under a significance level of 5%. For the 
remaining countries that are Bahrain, Mauritania, and Morocco, no causalities are 
found under this latter significance level, but are found only under a 10% significance 
level. For Bahrain, NEETs cause the labor force and are caused by the government 
effectiveness. In Morocco, the NEETs cause the political stability, the regulatory 
quality, the rule of law, and have a double causality with the government 
effectiveness. In Mauritania, the NEETs cause the control of corruption and are 
caused by the political stability. 
Policy makers in Arab economies need to put emphasis on implementing new 
policies and programs that targets mainly the NEETs. For countries in which the 
education, either general or vocational, causes the NEETs, it indicates that the 
capacity of schools and universities cannot undertake all the young population. This is 
also indicated by the expenditure on education. But when the NEETs are causing 
education, it might indicate that there are higher rates of dropouts. This can be 
interpreted such as schools and universities create discouraged students. 
In the case where labor force being the factor that causes the NEETs, it shows 
that there is a lack in the job supply within the economy. For this, governments need 
to create more job opportunities.  
Expenditure on health also causes the NEETs in some economies such as 
Libya. This means that there should be health access, insurance and, coverage for 
young individuals.  
For the world governance indicators causing the NEETs, policy makers need 
to put strategies for educating, training, and employing this category of young 
individuals, as to reduce to likelihood of the occurrence of political instability. 
Governments should also use different public offices, authorities, and NGOs to fight 
against corruption, as well as to increase the efficiency of public administration and 
the rule of low to minimize the NEETs population. 
This contribution provides supporting evidence about the corresponding 
environment specific to each of the Arab countries that lead to the increase of the 
NEETs. Thus, policy makers should put targeted strategies for NEETs inclusion and 
monitor the NEETs by monitoring education, macroeconomic, and political variables. 
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